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Following the collapse of property values and an increasing rate of default on high-risk 
mortgages, the United States experienced a subprime lending crisis that led to massive 
financial losses for holders of mortgage-backed securities.  The purpose of this 
correlational study was to examine if loan product and loan amount predict the likelihood 
of loan foreclosure.  The theoretical framework grounding the study was Minsky’s 
financial instability hypothesis, which describes the basis of capitalism as economic 
expansionism followed by financial crises.  The population consisted of 473 loan cases 
from archival data of the Atlanta Sixth Federal Reserve District in Georgia.  The method 
used to collect the data was a probabilistic simple random sample taken from the archival 
data.  The use of binary logistic regression resulted in a finding that the variables of loan 
product and loan amount significantly predicted the likelihood of loan foreclosure, χ2(4) 
= 10.65, p = .031, Nagelkerke R2 = .09.  The Nagelkerke R2 value indicated that the 
model explained 9% of the variability in foreclosure.  The findings specifically showed 
that Federal Housing Authority and Veterans Administration loan products were 
significantly more likely than conventional loans to cause losses for mortgage lenders.  
The implications for positive social change include increased stakeholder knowledge of 
various factors that can contribute to foreclosure and sustainment of community value 
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Section 1: Foundation of the Study  
The cause of the subprime lending crisis that began in 2007 was a rush among 
lenders to offer risky home loans to consumers (Donadelli, 2015).  The rise of private-
label, mortgage-backed securities led to the proliferation of risky investments (Horton, 
2013).  Prior to the crisis, which was a period in which private lenders approved loans 
with additional risk, federal lending regulations were inadequate (Razaki, Koprowski, & 
Manizha, 2013).  Many subprime loan consumers were obtaining high-rate mortgages, 
despite an analysis of credit histories and financial positions demonstrating their inability 
to fulfill such financial obligations (Razaki et al., 2013).   
Following new policies enacted after the 2007 subprime lending crisis, 
researchers and economists remained engaged in understanding the crisis, its effects, and 
the relationships among various factors (Avery & Brevoort, 2015; Boysen-Hogrefe, 
Jannsen, & Meier, 2015; Dong & Hansz, 2016; Fox, 2015; Hall, Crowder, & Spring, 
2015; Huang & Yeh, 2015; Mukerji, Saeed, & Tan, 2015; Spahr & Sunderman, 2014).  
Researchers’ sustained interest in the crisis has occurred partly because, as Fox (2015) 
explained, the effects of the crisis would continue for many years, especially in regions 
with high rates of negative home equity (Raymond, 2016).  To create policies to prevent 
similar financial crises in the future, an understanding of factors surrounding mortgage 
default, such as correlations between loan product, loan amount, and foreclosure 
(Pajarskas & Jočienė, 2015) was necessary. That was the focus of this study. 
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Background of the Problem 
After the recession of 2007–2009 ended in the United States, many housing 
markets throughout the country remain in periods of recovery extending well into the 
century’s second decade (Raymond, 2016).  With regard to the lending crisis, research 
exists on the effect of U.S. federal government policies (Avery & Brevoort, 2015), 
differences in strengths and recoveries of major and normal mortgage crises (Boysen-
Hogrefe et al., 2015), and the influence of household financial decisions (Mukerji et al., 
2015).  Despite the range of existing research, the subprime lending crisis remains a 
highly relevant topic of study with significant knowledge gaps.  One gap concerns the 
correlation between loan product, loan amount, and foreclosure in areas with high 
percentages of negative equity homes. 
Although the economic ripples from the housing bubble occurred throughout the 
United States, the focus of this study was on mortgage holders in Clayton, Henry, 
Rockdale, Fulton, and Spalding counties of the Sixth Federal Reserve District in Atlanta, 
Georgia.  This district had the highest rate of negative equity in the United States (Alm, 
Buschman, & Sjoquist, 2014; Georgia Watch, 2010; Raymond, 2016).  In 2014, 23% of 
the homes in the Sixth District had negative equity (Zillow, 2016).  The results of this 
study may contribute to developing and implementing home lending policies that are 
more effective and provide lenders with clearer insight into the relationship between loan 
product, loan amount, and foreclosure in regions with high rates of negative home equity. 
The subprime lending crisis led to significant losses, including bankruptcies in the 
banking industry (Lu & Whidbee, 2013).  An indicator of dire economic situations for 
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both consumers and lenders was high foreclosure rates in many states, including Georgia.  
Consequently, leaders of banks, mortgage lending companies, and other lending 
institutions may have an interest in understanding factors that affect the riskiness of home 
loans, such as loan product and loan amount.  The findings from the study include new 
information on the relationship between loan product, loan amount, and foreclosure that 
lenders might use to improve home lending policies.   
Problem Statement 
The root of the subprime lending crisis was poor economic and regulatory 
decisions made by lenders (Lu & Whidbee, 2013).  As of 2014, the average U.S. 
foreclosure rate was one out of every 1,199 homes (Lersch, Sellers, & Cromwell, 2015).  
The general business problem is that mortgage lenders lose profits from high rates of 
consumer foreclosure.  The specific business problem is that some mortgage lenders do 
not know if loan product and loan amount predict the likelihood of loan foreclosure.  
Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this quantitative correlational study was to examine if loan 
product and loan amount predict the likelihood of loan foreclosure.  The predictor 
variables were loan product and loan amount.  The criterion variable was foreclosure.  
The population consisted of data records of mortgage holders in Clayton, Henry, 
Rockdale, Fulton, and Spalding counties of the Atlanta Sixth Federal Reserve District in 
Georgia between 2013 and 2016.  Lenders may use results from this study to improve 
their understanding of factors associated with increased foreclosure risks.  Implications 
for positive social change include improved stakeholder understanding of the 
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correlations, if any, between loan product, loan amount, and foreclosure that may be 
useful in developing and implementing less risky lending policies.   
Nature of the Study 
The focus of this quantitative correlational study was to examine the degree of 
statistical significance of the correlation, if any, between the predictor variables, loan 
product and loan amount, and a criterion variable, foreclosure, in Clayton, Henry, 
Rockdale, Fulton, and Spalding counties of the Atlanta Sixth Federal Reserve District in 
Georgia.  The study involved investigating if loan product and loan amount significantly 
predicted the likelihood of loan foreclosure.  Thus, I chose a quantitative method for the 
study.  Hoare and Hoe (2013) noted the necessity of applying quantitative methods to 
study empirical data and assess hypotheses, relationships, and frequencies of 
observations.  Because the goal of this research was to investigate whether statistically 
significant relationships exist between loan product, loan amount, and foreclosure, a 
quantitative method met the needs of this study (Howell, 2013).  Qualitative and mixed 
method approaches involve an in-depth exploration of themes surrounding phenomena 
(Palinkas et al., 2015).  However, because the purpose of this research was to examine 
quantifiable concepts statistically rather than to explore the in-depth and subjective 
experiences of individual participants, qualitative and mixed method approaches were not 
suitable.  
Researchers use correlation designs to examine relationships between variables 
and test hypotheses (Howell, 2013).  The correlation design was the best choice because 
the study involved testing hypotheses.  A true experimental design involves applying 
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random assignment of data to an archival data set; thus, a correlational design was the 
best approach.  The outcome of this design was an observation of possible relationships 
between loan product, loan amount, and foreclosure. 
Research Question 
The research question and hypotheses for the study were as follows:  
RQ: Do loan product and loan amount predict the likelihood of loan foreclosure? 
H0: Loan product and loan amount do not predict the likelihood of loan 
foreclosure. 
Ha: Loan product and loan amount do predict the likelihood of loan 
foreclosure. 
Theoretical Framework 
The basis of the theoretical framework for the study was Minsky’s (1986) 
financial instability hypothesis (FIH).  Minsky noted that financial crises are integral to 
capitalist economies because periods of excessive economic prosperity result in 
increasingly reckless behaviors by borrowers and lenders.  Financial bubbles form as a 
result, which later burst and lead to economic crises such as the 2007–2009 recession 
(Minsky, 2015).  According to the theory, capitalist economies tend to move from periods 
of stability to periods of instability, which is often the result of insufficient or poorly 
enforced government policies (Minsky, 1986).  In this study, the insufficient policies 
included poorly enforced home loan lending regulations and the reckless behavior of 
lenders approving risky home loans.  The specific focus of this study was the predictive 
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effect of loan product and loan amount, the predictor variables, on the criterion variable, 
which was the likelihood of foreclosure. 
According to Minsky (1986), the FIH is a form of market failure, summarized as 
follows: success leads to excess, which results in crisis.  Successful markets generally 
lead to excessive lending by banks in the form of high-risk home loans to poorly 
qualified borrowers (Minsky, 1986).  Over time, a crisis develops when the borrowers 
who agreed to pay such loans can no longer afford the mortgage payments (Minsky, 
2015).  As a result, borrowers default on home loans, which results in foreclosure, and 
mortgage lenders experience significant financial loss.   
The larger the loan a lender grants, the more significant the risk for default, 
foreclosure, and losses (Caverzasi, 2014).  Thus, investment decisions create revenue 
streams as well as streams of financial commitments from borrowers.  As long as 
borrowers fulfill their commitments, the economy remains stable.  However, when 
borrowers enter foreclosure, financial crises can occur (Caverzasi, 2014), which is 
precisely the chain of events that began when the housing market crashed in 2007–2008.  
In the wake of the recession, weak housing markets led to large geographic pockets of 
homes with negative equity.  Thus, Minsky’s (1986) FIH provides a theoretical lens 
through which to explore possible correlations among home loan product, loan amount, 
and foreclosure.  
Definition of Terms 
Great Recession: The Great Recession refers to a period of economic downturn in 
global markets related to the financial crisis of 2007–2008 (Peicuti, 2014). 
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Housing crisis: A housing crisis refers to an economic condition in which an 
increased demand exists for new and existing housing met through a corresponding 
increase in borrowed funds and increasing home values at a higher-than-average rate that 
leads to risky debt arrangements (Aßmann, Boysen-Hogrefe, & Jannsen, 2013).   
Mortgage default: Mortgages in default are over 90 days past due (Anyamele, 
2015). 
Mortgage delinquency: Mortgages are generally delinquent after nonpayment for 
at least 30 days.  Delinquency is the stage that occurs prior to default (Anyamele, 2015).  
For the purpose of this study, a loan was delinquent when it was between 30 and 89 days 
past due.   
Mortgage foreclosure: Mortgage foreclosure refers to the process of a lender 
repossessing a home when a mortgage borrower misses a monthly payment for a certain 
period, usually 3 months (Zhu & Pace, 2015). 
Mortgage lenders: Mortgage lenders are institutions within the financial sector 
with a focus on brokering, counseling, and providing financial assistance to potential 
homeowners (Khan, 2014).   
Predatory lending: Predatory lending describes the deceptive practices of 
creditors, brokers, or home improvement contractors that involve taking unfair advantage 
of a borrower’s lack of knowledge (Agarwal, Amromin, Ben-David, Chomsisengphet, & 
Evanoff, 2013).   
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Securitization: Securitization describes the process of grouping bank assests, such 
as mortgages, into marketable securities and transferring the securities into bankruptcy-
remote organizational entities that finance purchases through issuing securities. 
Subprime lending: Subprime lending refers to mortgage-backed financing for 
risky borrowers denied access to prime loans (Bhardwaj & Sengupta, 2012).   
Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations 
Assumptions 
Assumptions refer to aspects of research or occurrences the researcher believes to 
be true but that lack particular proof (Nkwake & Morrow, 2016).  Assumptions are 
important in research because assumptions provide a basis for influencing and developing 
theories.  One assumption about the population of borrowers within the archival data was 
that the population would represent similar demographic areas throughout the United 
States.  Homeowners in Georgia include yearlong residents, as well as vacation 
homeowners who visit on a seasonal basis.  Another assumption was that the data would 
be an accurate reflection of the actual foreclosure rates for the time represented.  The 
third assumption was that the proper sale of the loan for those who applied and qualified 
for prime, Federal Housing Authority (FHA), or subprime loans occurred in good faith 
and was free of lending biases such as socioeconomic or racial prejudices (Courchane, 
Darolia, & Zorn, 2014).   
Limitations 
Limitations are issues or circumstances that could curtail the progress of a 
particular project or research question investigation (Krupa, 2014).  Limitations may be 
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of a legal nature or influenced by the sociocultural views associated with the subject in 
question (Krupa, 2014).  One limitation for this study was that uncontrolled changes in 
unemployment rates and unemployment accounted for missed loan payments.  The 
geographic region that was the source of the aggregate data was five counties in the state 
of Georgia. 
Delimitations 
A study’s delimitations refer to the study’s boundaries (Salvador, 2016).  
Important considerations include understanding what to do, reasons for choosing one 
aspect over the other, methodology procedures chosen, and the reasons for choosing a 
certain subject.  A delimitation for this study was the use of archival data from five 
counties in Atlanta’s Sixth Federal District in the state of Georgia.  Foreclosure data from 
the sample included loan type and excluded interest rate, borrower demographic 
information, and other economic factors, such as employment rates, that could be factors 
in foreclosure.  Mortgages included in the data set were only those that borrowers 
obtained for single-family homes through mortgage lenders, which excluded any 
commercial loans and investment properties used for the sole purpose of collecting rent.  
Finally, the selected time frame of analysis, 2013 to 2016, was another delimiting factor. 
Significance of the Study 
The U.S. housing market functions as a major part of the economy.  Many lenders 
may reduce losses through a more complete understanding of the riskiness of different 
loan types.  Results from this study contribute to the field of business, as leaders of 
financial entities may be able to create loan packages that are viable, efficacious, and 
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more realistic for clients.  When lenders ensure borrowers can repay the loans, positive 
lending practices encourage loan packages that may prevent future foreclosures.  Such 
actions can contribute to more effective business practices among lenders, which can free 
borrowers from unaffordable loans and contractual traps, such as using financial 
incentives that encourage lenders to steer borrowers into more costly loans that keep 
borrowers in undesirable financial situations.  To create policies to prevent similar 
financial crises in the future, factors surrounding mortgage default, such as correlations 
between loan product, loan amounts, and foreclosure rates, must be understood (Pajarskas 
& Jočienė, 2015).  Lenders with improved knowledge and lending practices may make 
better decisions to guide them toward less risky loan generation, thus improving profits 
and sustainability.   
The ramifications of positive lending decisions can discourage the sale of 
unsustainable mortgages to a secondary market and potentially provide lenders with 
insight into which loan types present the most significant risks based on different factors, 
thus contributing to positive social change.  Foreclosure creates significant social and 
economic crises that ripple throughout society, including low property values and poor 
neighborhood quality (Kim, Wilmarth, & Choi, 2016).  A better understanding of 
foreclosure risk factors, such as loan product and mortgage amount, might help 
consumers and lenders make better borrowing and lending decisions. 
A Review of the Professional and Academic Literature 
The bursting of the housing bubble preceded the Great Recession of 2007, quickly 
followed by the exponential increase of foreclosures that reached levels not seen since the 
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Great Depression in the 1930s (Peicuti, 2014).  The bursting of the housing bubble 
triggered a Great Recession that undermined the global economy (Iqbal & Vitner, 2013).  
The effects of mortgage defaults in the subprime market spread quickly from banks to 
other areas of the U.S. economy, such as corporate bonds (Krainer & Laderman, 2013) 
and pension funds (Schwartz, 2012).  A lack of sufficient U.S. government regulation led 
investors to make risky bets on high-risk securities, which resulted in a recession (Casu, 
Clare, Sarkisyan, & Thomas, 2013).  The high-risk securities lost value when borrowers 
no longer made payments against the loans that composed the security, which 
subsequently lost more value as the failure rates grew.  Understanding the factors, 
consequences, and responses to the Great Recession is important to appreciate the state of 
the housing market during that period.  
The purpose of this literature review was to explore mortgage loan types and 
lending practices related to the ripple effects of the 2007-2009 economic recession 
continuing into the next decade throughout parts of the United States.  The research 
included a general context about borrowers and lenders relevant to the exploration and 
analysis of the relationships between loan products, loan amounts, and foreclosure.  The 
concepts within the literature align through a comparison of contemporaneous peer-
reviewed research and past theoretical constructs for understanding the mortgage industry 
on a macroeconomic level and market challenges affecting lenders.  The literature review 
may reveal areas for continued research for future researchers.  The synthesis of related 
literature provides a detailed discussion of Minsky’s FIH, as well as the four major types 
of mortgages available to homeowners: (a) prime, (b) subprime, (c) FHA, and (d) U.S. 
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Department of Veterans Affairs (VA).  The major economic factors forming the context 
of the subprime lending crisis are (a) U.S. governmental policies and regulations, (b) 
securitization and investment vehicles, (c) fraudulent banking practices, (d) housing 
prices, (e) unemployment and the economy, and (f) predatory lending.   
Literature Review Search Strategy 
This review of the literature includes peer-reviewed journal articles from online 
databases.  I accessed the documents through Google Scholar and the Walden University 
library, where a multitude of other databases contained articles for review.  Articles 
pertinent to this study originated from the following databases: Academic OneFile, 
EBSCO, ProQuest, Science Direct, SpringerLink, and Taylor & Francis.  Multiple 
Boolean searches yielded relevant research using the following keywords: crisis, default, 
financial, foreclosure, Great Recession, housing crisis, interest rates, lending, loan types, 
mortgage foreclosure, predatory lending, real estate, mortgage companies, prime, 
subprime mortgage, and financial instability hypothesis.  The number of sources from the 
combined search results for these keywords was 376,421.  Articles pertained to general 
inquiries regarding the housing crisis, foreclosure, mortgage loan types, and the Great 
Recession.  Of the 136 references, 85% were less than 5 years old from the anticipated 
Chief Academic Officer approval date in 2017, and 85% of the references were peer 
reviewed.  The preliminary search results for the selected keywords and the number of 
articles for each searched term appear in Table 1.  The total number and percentage of 
sources published within the past 5 years and peer reviewed documents used in this study 




Preliminary Search Results for Selected Terms 
Search term Number of articles 
Great Recession 166,481 
Housing crisis 124,783 
Predatory lending 50,332 
Subprime mortgage 161,810 
Financial instability hypothesis 1,291 
Loan types 30,452 
Subprime lending crisis 3,081 
Total  376,421 
 
Table 2 
Types of Sources 
Reference type No. of sources % of total
Scholarly sources published after 2013 115 84.5
Scholarly sources that have been peer reviewed 115 84.5
 
Financial Instability Hypothesis 
According to Minsky (1986), the basis of capitalism is economic expansionism, 
followed by financial crises.  Minsky did not believe the economic system was self-
sustaining and equilibrium-seeking.  Rather, Minsky (1992) posited that inflations and 
deflations in capitalist economies had the potential to occur rapidly and cause economic 
damage.  Minsky (1992) posited that increases in indebtedness generally accompany 
periods of economic growth because lenders feel confident that borrowers will be able to 
repay loans in a generally successful economic climate.  Charles (2015) explained such a 
climate results in rising debt ratios that balloon to a point where debt begins to threaten 
vulnerable economic units.   
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As borrowers begin to fail to uphold their financial agreements, leaders of banks 
must sharply increase interest rates to compensate.  Deflation risks occur when lenders 
must sell off assets to pay back debts.  Charles (2015) noted that without outside 
intervention, recessions could develop into severe depressions, such as the one that 
occurred in 1929.  As White (2015) explained, Minsky believed that debt-based finance 
and intermediaries such as banks were inherently volatile.  Thus, the basis of Minsky’s 
(1992) FIH is the assumption that capitalist financial systems do not naturally move 
toward states of equilibrium; rather, they tend to grow until they explode, which creates a 
financial crisis (White, 2015).  In the wake of such crises, problems such as high 
foreclosure rates and negative home equity can occur. 
Minsky (1986) theorized three different categories of risk positions of banks: 
hedge, speculative, and Ponzi.  Hedge finances are low risk with low leverage, 
speculative finances involve slightly higher rates of risk and leverage than hedge, and 
Ponzi finances represent the riskiest category with the highest leverage.  Subprime 
mortgages are an example of a Ponzi system.  To prevent financial crises, Minsky (1992) 
hypothesized two conditions were necessary: big government and an alert lender of last 
resort.  Big government describes federal stabilizers and discretionary policies to stabilize 
economic demands.  The role of the latter, as Chan, Sharygin, Been, and Haughwout 
(2013) described, is to (a) provide liquidity so borrowers do not have to liquidate assets, 
(b) regulate the financial systems to prevent financial instability, and (c) restructure 
existing debts to reduce the burden placed on borrowers.  President Obama’s $787 billion 
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stimulus package was the government’s attempt to act as a lender of last resort, though 
critics disparaged it as merely a collective failure (Epstein, 2013). 
Minsky’s (1986) FIH is evident in the economic cycles of the capitalist United 
States, especially in the subprime lending crisis, the consequent housing bubble, and the 
economic crisis of foreclosure and negative home equity that followed.  The cycles of 
borrowing and lending and of economic prosperity and crisis are evident throughout U.S. 
economic history.  Minsky’s suggestion that capitalist economies do not demonstrate a 
natural homeostasis that gently pushes them toward stabilization, but rather such 
economies are in constant oscillation between economic prosperity and economic 
depression, strongly aligned with this study.  Periods of economic prosperity precariously 
rely upon increasing levels of indebtedness and reliance on future money (Minsky, 1992) 
that may never materialize due to borrower defaults and the resulting spikes in interest 
rates for all borrowers.   
The economic instability generated from poor government regulation and the 
resulting financial bubble surfaced during the explosive growth of subprime mortgages 
generated in 2005 (Tan & Cheong, 2014).  This period of economic growth included 
increased subprime lending by banks and other lenders and increased indebtedness 
among mortgage borrowers.  The economic bubble created by unregulated subprime 
lending burst following 2007, indicated by an almost 350% increase in foreclosures in the 
United States between 2007 and 2010 (Houle, 2014; Tan & Cheong, 2014).  After 2009, 
the housing market began to recover slowly, and 2015 was the strongest year for new and 
existing home sales since the housing bubble burst (U.S. Census Bureau, 2016).  Thus, 
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the housing economy in 2015 demonstrated recovery in many areas.  However, regional 
pockets throughout the United States, such as counties in the Sixth Federal District, 
continue to experience high rates of negative equity that have hampered economic 
recovery (Goodman, Zhu, & George, 2014).  According to Minsky’s (1992) FIH, 
consumers should view any signs of economic recovery with caution, as the market’s 
tendency toward oscillation over homeostasis may result in movement toward another 
economic bubble.     
Palley (2010) noted that a Minskyian view of the subprime mortgage crisis 
includes a focus on the instability of financial markets, while new Marxist, Keynesian, 
and social structure of accumulation (SSA) interpretations include a deeper focus on the 
root causes of economic crises.  For example, the new Marxist approach indicates the 
crisis was the result of stagnation to which capitalist economies historically return 
(Jefferies, 2015).  The SSA approach involves viewing the crisis as a contradiction within 
neoliberal regimes of capital accumulation and growth resulting from over 30 years of 
stagnant wages and income inequality (Palley, 2010).  On the other hand, the Keynesian 
view focuses on an aggregate demand from structural changes resulting from 
neoliberalism. 
A post-Keynesian view of the subprime mortgage crisis includes an examination 
of several potential root causes, such as failures of international markets, poor financial 
regulation, securitization errors in the structuring of low quality assets, shifts toward 
financialization, and poorly calculated monetary policies (Koutsobinas, 2010).  In 
addition, post-Keynesian observers consider the role of stakeholder expectations in the 
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financial crisis (Lavoie, 2016).  For example, Koutsobinas (2010) contended that 
stakeholders can factor many so-called psychological expectations into the collapse of the 
housing market, such as (a) expectations for housing appreciation, (b) attempts to 
minimize losses by major financial institutions, (c) the too-big-to-fail myth, and (d) 
liquidity preferences.  Koutsobina argued that the prevalence of the effects of role 
expectations in the subprime mortgage crisis was so profound that the period would have 
been more appropriately labeled a Keynes moment.   
Another theory considered for this study was SSA (Kotz, 2013; Lippit, 2014).  
According to the SSA theory, sequences of relatively stable institutional structures occur 
in capitalist societies that can last for several decades each.  Each of these structures is an 
SSA.  These SSAs represent coherent sets of institutions that promote capitalist 
accumulations for significant periods until institutional contradictions intensify, which 
leads to long periods of structural crises (Kotz, 2013; Lippit, 2014).  Each of the SSA 
crises last until new SSAs replace them (Keaney, 2014).  Although the SSA theory can 
help explain how such institutional and structural crises arise, the crises examined in 
some of the SSA literature do not necessarily reflect severe structural crises (Kotz, 2013).  
The subprime mortgage crisis was a severe crisis; thus, SSA theory was not the most 
suitable theory for the current study.  
Finally, Marxist theorists claimed that the subprime mortgage crisis was the result 
of fundamental flaws in capitalism (Jefferies, 2015).  According to Marxist theory, 
overinvestment creates financial bubbles, and managerial decisions based on the best 
financial interests of managers, rather than stakeholders, can emphasize share price over 
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value.  As a result, failures of financial gatekeepers lead to financial collapse (Hausman 
& Johnson, 2014).  Although a Marxist interpretation of the subprime mortgage crisis 
includes acknowledgement of the financial bubbles inherent to capitalist economies, the 
theorists do not consider the constant fluctuations or cycles of economies.   
Palley (2010) contended that scholars must view any substantial level of analysis 
and policy recommendation of the 2007-2009 crisis using an inferable Marxist-SSA-
Structural Keynesian lens.  The cycle of economic recessions, Palley contended, will 
accompany any rework of the financial sector that fails to bridge the gap between 
workers’ earnings and economic expansion.  Nevertheless, Palley recognized that 
Minsky’s (1992) FIH epitomized the financial crisis driven by mortgage lenders and 
speculators’ exuberance.  Koutsobinas’s (2010) post-Keynesian perspective or the 
Marxist-SSA-structural Keynesian lens concerns a much larger dimension or macro level 
of the economy.  Though Koutsobinas’s post-Keynesian perspective or the Marxist-SSA-
structural include valid arguments, they may not be adequate to the level of focus or 
analysis for this study.  The specific focus of the study was the risk of different loan types 
through each phase of economic instability surrounding the crisis; thus, Minsky’s (1992) 
FIH was a more appropriate theoretical lens for this examination. 
Loan Products 
Four major loan types exist for borrowers and are contingent upon income; one 
loan type requires current or past military service: conventional, subprime, FHA, and VA.  
Borrowers may obtain conventional home loans, termed prime loans, if they (a) qualify 
with sufficiently low debt-to-income ratios, and (b) possess required levels of down 
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payments and credit scores (Hendrickson & Nichols, 2011).  Subprime loans are suitable 
for relatively lower wage earners with higher debt-to-income ratios than prime loan 
holders and nearly no money available for a down payment (Bhardwaj & Sengupta, 
2012).  The FHA is a provider of federally guaranteed home loans for low-income 
borrowers with credit scores below the threshold for prime loans and spends a larger 
portion of income on debt than prime loan holders.  Finally, the VA has special pricing 
and criteria for home loans for veterans of the U.S. armed services.  Primarily, 
researchers have focused on subprime loans because of the high failure rates before and 
during the subprime lending crisis. 
Factors predicting delinquency, such as economic conditions, loan characteristics, 
and borrower characteristics, exist across all loan types.  Zacks and Zacks (2015) 
examined data from 2004 to 2009 and established that borrower income and loan type 
were primary determinants of borrowers’ ability to pay mortgages.  Thus, the health of 
the national economy was an indicator of borrowers’ ability to fulfill mortgage 
obligations.  Servicer compensation and the high costs of renegotiating loans in default, 
accounting standards, and liens junior to the problematic loan impeded loan 
modifications (McCoy, 2013).  Officials within the Obama administration attempted to 
stem two of the factors affecting loans through the Home Affordable Modification Plan 
of 2009: loan characteristics and economic conditions (Beckett, 2013; McCoy, 2013).  
The president’s proposal to alleviate the harmful effects of the burst of the housing 
bubble benefited all stakeholders and the U.S. economy (Beckett, 2013).  In addition, the 
proposal represented a forceful and effective response to the subprime lending crisis.  
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Congress also intervened with the subprime lending crisis to try to correct the problem by 
introducing the Home Affordable Modification Plan.   
The Home Affordable Modification Plan may result in a significant reduction in 
vacant foreclosed homes (Beckett, 2013).  Schwartz (2012) examined the state of the 
housing sector 5 years after its collapse in 2007 and the most significant policies 
implemented by the Obama administration.  After investigating President Obama’s 
response measures to the foreclosure crisis, the subsequent policies affecting the sector, 
and some of the weaknesses in the housing programs, Schwartz noted the executive 
branch could not address the housing crisis effectively because of Republican control in 
the House of Representatives.  Federal congressional and executive branch actions were 
not in sufficient balance to promote a safe and positive transition through one of the 
greatest economic downturns in American history.  Programs such as the Home 
Affordable Modification Plan addressed lending and borrowing concerns prior to 
foreclosure, but did little to prevent a loan from going into default.  Discovering which 
loan types are likely to end in default may influence future program success and sound 
fiscal practices.  
Subprime mortgages.  Leaders of financial institutions developed subprime 
loans to add diversity to loan portfolios and to extend credit to borrowers who failed to 
qualify for prime loans that were the traditional avenues of financing (Bhardwaj & 
Sengupta, 2012).  Rising home values during the subprime lending crisis lessened the risk 
to lenders (Foote & Willen, 2016), as did a robust market in which investors easily sold 
foreclosed properties before incurring any appreciable losses.  The attractiveness of a 
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subprime loan for borrowers who did not qualify for a conventional home loan was the 
temporary credit accommodation (Bhardwaj & Sengupta, 2012), the potential for 
accumulation of equity within the home, and development of a positive credit history.  
Regardless of the fiscally difficult loan terms, the attraction of home ownership enticed 
many people into financial situations from which they would be unable to recover.   
During changes in FHA programs, subprime lending filled the needs of potential 
borrowers (Courchane et al., 2014).  Researchers investigated whether lenders coerced 
FHA, prime, and subprime borrowers into home ownership through financially unfeasible 
avenues.  Lack of awareness regarding the mortgage process made borrowers less likely 
to search for the best mortgage rate in the market, and they may not have received 
sufficient information regarding options.  Since 2009, the benefits of optimal mortgages, 
including range of expansion, tax advantages, and a decrease in the value of transactions 
incurred when purchasing homes, may continue to offer positive alternatives (Cocco, 
2013).  Consumer complaints have continued about the lack of clear foreclosure laws and 
procedures.  According to many borrowers, the large number of foreclosures is the result 
of a lack of proper communication by lenders regarding the foreclosure process.   
A strong correlation exists between subprime mortgages and economic crises such 
as foreclosures (Guesmi, Kaabia, & Kazi, 2013).  In 2007, when subprime mortgages 
became popular among financial institutions, the mortgage crisis expanded and led to 
other problems, such as the housing crisis (Guesmi et al., 2013).  The mortgage default 
crisis started in 2005 and by the end of 2008, the rate of default had reached about 5.2% 
(Mayer, Pence, & Sherlund, 2013).  An increase in default cases resulted in an increase of 
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foreclosure cases across the country, especially for subprime mortgages in which 
borrowers defaulted at higher rates than holders of all other mortgage types because 
lenders of this type of mortgage usually targeted borrowers with poor credit histories 
(Mayer et al., 2013).  Many terms and conditions in subprime mortgages caused borrower 
confusion, which led to an increase in default cases (Mayer et al., 2013).  Contributing to 
the default rates were high prepayment penalties that reduced borrowers’ ability to repay 
loans in full and discouraged the sale of properties.  
The subprime market failure occurred for various reasons, including an increase 
in the risk characteristics of subprime loans as opposed to past practices, which were 
more conservative.  A major cause of the subprime lending crisis was the ineffective risk 
reduction methods of financial institutions (Pajarskas & Jočienė, 2015).  A majority of 
lenders failed to conduct an analysis of credit risks and investigate borrowers’ ability to 
repay loans.  However, the success of the subprime mortgage market in early 2007, 
brought about by lower interest rates, mitigated the number of losses and default cases 
among subprime loans (Makarov & Plantin, 2013).   
Another cause of the subprime lending crisis was easy admittance to the loan 
market.  For example, insufficient documentation in the subprime loan market led to 
increased default rates (Pajarskas & Jočienė, 2015).  Most financial institution leaders 
reduced admittance conditions to obtain high yields and profits (Nelson & Katzenstein, 
2014), which encouraged borrowers to make loan commitments without providing 
adequate proof of a capability to repay the loans.  Lenders could prevent the economic 
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downturn that resulted from subprime lending by instituting tighter lending policies and 
reduced interest rates (Moulton, 2012).  
The subprime housing crisis affected the economy by changing individual and 
institutional principles regarding credit (Moulton, 2012).  People borrowed money 
through home loans that were excessive and beyond borrowers’ means (Prohaska & 
Lichtenstein, 2014).  Investors ignored standard risk versus reward practices and invested 
heavily in the mortgage sector to pursue high returns.  Among lessons learned from the 
subprime lending crisis were that irresponsible lending and the failure to monitor and 
analyze borrowers’ ability to repay loans led to major financial losses (Prohaska & 
Lichtenstein, 2014).  The risk of having too many subprime loans in a portfolio became 
the greatest risk such lenders assumed.  If default was to occur, a model of lender 
expectations included increased home prices as a reduction in risk (Moulton, 2014).  The 
model indicated subprime lending was a way for lenders to alleviate default risks if home 
prices increased steadily or aggressively.  The critical decline in prices undermined 
lenders’ ability to calculate favorable risk-to-reward ratios, which harmed institutions and 
borrowers. 
Subprime mortgages comprised the majority of note defaults and caused a 
dramatic increase in the default rate (Pajarskas & Jočienė, 2015).  As a result, 
securitization developed as a way to minimize mortgage risks and improve efficiency of 
the housing market.  In addition, the aim is to reduce transaction expenses and ensure 
flexibility in financial operations.  The role of securitization with subprime loans 
contributed to the subprime loan problems in the housing market, such as expedited 
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approvals, approvals without proper financial history, and predatory lending (Peicuti, 
2013).  Securitization increased defaults by about 20% because of the reduced quality of 
credit assessments and increased focus on quantity, not quality, of mortgages obtained 
(Peicuti, 2013).  Securitization weakened incentives for thoroughly assessing customers, 
and many high-risk borrowers gained access to mortgages.  Apart from poor screening of 
borrowers, securitization led to a housing crisis by increasing the complexity of mortgage 
products, which made the process difficult and confusing for borrowers to analyze 
financial risks effectively (Peicuti, 2013).  The ability for financial institutions to package 
high-risk, subprime loans into attractive market-based securities enticed the sales of 
mortgages to people who were not creditworthy. 
Prime mortgages.  Private financial institutions typically provide conventional 
home loans to well-qualified borrowers who demonstrate fiscal acuity and low risk 
(McCoy, 2013).  The other term for conventional loans, prime loans, is a reference to a 
lending rate close to the prime lending rate set forth by the U.S. Treasury.  In 2009, 3% of 
prime loans were in foreclosure, 15.1% of subprime loans were in foreclosure, 3.2% of 
FHA loans were in foreclosure, and 2.2% of VA loans were in foreclosure (U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2012).  Credit score analysis of prime loans showed that the home mortgage 
lending market became risk averse between 2005 and 2008, where high-risk lending 
decreased by half as the crisis began to affect the global economy (Immergluck, 2011).  
Several factors affected this trend, including the freezing and contraction of global credit 
markets and the continuous decline in home values across the United States and 
throughout the world (Immergluck, 2011).   
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Prime loans had many of the same negative effects from low loan-to-value ratios, 
low credit scores, and variable interest rates.  Home prices played a major role in the 
housing crisis, in which the effect was much more evident for the subprime lending 
market (Bhardwaj & Sengupta, 2014).  Borrowers with prime loans experienced 
escalated default rates and poor lending practices, but the percentages were substantially 
less than for borrowers in the subprime markets.  The same was true for the commercial 
markets, where a substantial increase in delinquency occurred.  In 2007, commercial loan 
delinquency rates were 1.94%, whereas 2010 rates increased to 10.84% (U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2012).  Subprime markets received attention because of the rates, but the total 
dollar amounts for prime and commercial loan delinquencies may have been substantially 
higher, which indicates a need for researchers to explore loan products and loan amounts. 
Federal Housing Administration (FHA) mortgages.  Borrowers looking for a 
mortgage during the subprime lending crisis had several choices if prime lenders denied 
the prime loan application.  One alternative was through the FHA, where borrowers 
receive loans secured by the federal government and not insured by a private mortgage 
insurance company.  The FHA facilitates stabilization in housing markets on a national or 
regional scale and promotes federal policy through lender services of last resort for 
poorly qualified applicants (Bhardwaj & Sengupta, 2012; Quercia & Park, 2013).  The 
FHA efforts include liberal loan terms, mortgage insurance, and the creation of 
nontraditional mortgages (Bhardwaj & Sengupta, 2012).  FHA loans differ regarding the 
terms within the mortgage, such as interest rates, indemnification risks, and prepayment 
penalties (Smith, 2012).  Smith investigated the relationship between subprime and FHA 
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loans and the disproportionate number of foreclosed properties, which highlighted the 
number of borrowers who received subprime loans but could have easily qualified for 
FHA loans.  The findings from Smith’s study supported economic indicators that showed 
more borrowers should choose to pursue FHA loans before going to the subprime market 
and possibly stimulating another housing crisis. 
Subprime Lending  
The United States experienced an economic recession because of the credit crisis 
associated with the subprime mortgage crisis (Thakor, 2015).  Between 2006 and 2009, 
house prices decreased by approximately 32%, and some metropolitan areas, such as 
Detroit, experienced decreases greater than 50% (Schwartz, 2012).  The effects of the 
housing bubble bursting included an increase in mortgage foreclosures (Beckett, 2013) 
and the failure of mortgage-backed securities (Prohaska & Lichtenstein, 2014).  Multiple 
factors contributed to the Great Recession, and some of the effects continue to resonate in 
parts of the United States and the world.  A discussion of these factors follows. 
Liberal lending regulations led to risky investing that eventually caused the Great 
Recession; however, other aspects of local and global economies contributed to the crisis 
(Gangel, Seiler, & Collins, 2013; Guesmi et al., 2013).  As much as the failure of the 
subprime mortgage market caused the subprime lending crisis, the economic recession 
that followed made the situation worse (Gangel et al., 2013; Guesmi et al., 2013).  The 
Great Recession led to high unemployment rates in the United States (Rana & Shea, 
2015).  Consequently, people who could previously afford to service mortgages no longer 
had the income to make payments, especially middle-class workers.  Unemployment 
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without a fiscal safety net led to the inability to pay mortgages (Agarwal, Deng, Luo, & 
Qian, 2016; Gyourko & Tracy, 2014; Schwartz, 2012; Shi & Riley, 2014; Tatom 2013).  
The rise of unemployment rates reflected the decline of the United States economy and 
global economies and consumers had to choose between paying their mortgages and 
meeting the essential survival needs of their families (Keene, Lynch, & Castro, 2014).  
Prior to the housing crisis, for consumers with medical expenses, medical bills became 
catastrophic financial obligations for families already struggling to pay their mortgages 
(Courchane et al., 2014).  Borrowers, especially those with subprime mortgages, were in 
a financial maelstrom that negatively affected multiple aspects of their daily lives.  
Also contributing to the mortgage failure rates was the exponential decrease in 
home values (Gyourko & Tracy, 2014; LoPucki, 2014; Shi & Riley, 2014).  Investors 
used rising home prices as part of the lending equation to justify risky investments in 
subprime borrowers, which would have offset losses had home values remained level or 
showed limited increases (Bhardwaj & Sengupta, 2012).  A contagion effect occurs when 
home values within a city or neighborhood begin to decline rapidly because of default 
(Kaabia & Abid, 2013); conditions that cause more defaults and are responses that 
fostered the recession (McCoy, 2013).  Previously thought of as a stable investment, 
homes were no longer a source to build equity.  
The deregulation of banking opened new and riskier markets for mortgages and 
mortgage-backed securities and made consumers vulnerable to fraudulent practices 
termed predatory lending (Dymski, Hernandez, & Mohanty, 2013; Mayer, Cava, & 
Baird, 2014).  Prior to the collapse of the markets, securitization was a financial vehicle 
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used to diversify account holdings and open up credit (Casu et al., 2013); however, the 
rampant formation of these securities led to the demise of many financial institutions.  
During the recession, extensive losses within the banking industry led to closing high-risk 
product offerings, as well as conventional credit offerings (Gangel et al., 2013; 
Ramcharan, Verani, & Van den Heuvel, 2016).  Business leaders were unable to secure 
loans for daily operations and forced to reduce labor costs and reduce the scale of 
business performed.   
Many factors contributed to the Great Recession and the collapse of the housing 
industry in 2007, which had national and global ramifications (Casu et al., 2013).  
Although the foreclosure crisis began a year prior to the Great Recession, researchers 
disagree on the depth of its influence on the recession.  For example, Tatom (2013) 
posited that the Great Recession was not the result of the mortgage foreclosure crisis, but 
a symptom of poor financial policies that led to the failure of many institutions dependent 
upon the housing industry.  Despite differing theories on the origination of the Recession, 
a close link exists between the Great Recession and several striking trends in the United 
States, including increased foreclosures, a rising unemployment rate, and a rapid decline 
in housing prices (Rana & Shea, 2015).  For example, practical models of mortgage 
nonpayment showed unemployment was a recognized risk factor that affected borrowers’ 
leverage (Gyourko & Tracy, 2014).  Rana and Shea (2015) found that foreclosures were 
not indicators of a depressed economy, but that shocks to foreclosures resulted from a 





Predatory lending is the act of imposing unethical loan conditions on customers 
(Choplin & Stark, 2013).  The practice of predatory lending was among the factors that 
contributed to the housing and subprime mortgage crisis, and contributed to the increase 
in the number of loan default cases by about one third (Agarwal et al., 2013).  Lenders 
have access to private information regarding borrowers and borrowers’ ability to repay 
loans and some lenders who engaged in predatory lending were aware of borrowers’ 
inability to pay a mortgage (Agarwal et al., 2013).  Loan terms imposed made future 
repayment of the loans impossible for borrowers.  Lack of strategies to measure the 
effects of predatory lending on mortgage performance led to predatory lending (Agarwal 
et al., 2013).   
State and federal interventions.  Although the housing crisis highlighted the 
problems associated with predatory lending, the practice has been ongoing (Hendrickson 
& Nichols, 2011; Neuenschwander & Proffitt, 2014).  Corrective efforts at the U.S. 
federal and state levels were an attempt to resolve the challenges caused by the practice.  
However, in 2004, the federal comptroller of currency preempted state laws to create a 
situation in which banks were not subject to state laws.  The action undermined 
antipredatory efforts at the state level.  Hendrickson and Nichols (2011) reported that 
bank performance improved significantly after the ruling by the comptroller, when a 
bank’s charter governing operations and the lending laws changed in response to such 
rulings.  Thus, federal regulation of the banking industry is more effective than state-level 
regulation, which indicates a need for federal regulation within the housing industry.  
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Mayer et al. (2014) noted that the present laws were ineffective in curbing predatory 
behavior among lenders.  Future researchers could establish which changes will make the 
federal law more effective in reducing foreclosures. 
Effect on subprime lending crisis.  Lenders used predatory lending to make their 
offers attractive to a large number of borrowers (Mayer et al., 2014).  The aim of 
predatory lending is to comply with requirements to make borrowers aware of the risks 
involved using complex mortgage terms (Mayer et al., 2014).  Predatory lending is a 
major problem in the contemporary housing market and had a significant role in creating 
the subprime lending crisis in the country (Agarwal et al., 2013).  The problem of 
predatory lending worsened because of numerous avenues that lenders used to issue 
subprime loans that undermined the national economy by selling products that people 
could not pay for because politicians were unable to define the problems and create 
appropriate legislation to prevent the problems (Bubb & Krishnamurthy, 2015).  
Elimination of the practice is likely because of concerted efforts from numerous parties.  
Industry stakeholders need to define the term and create appropriate policy measures and 
laws based on that definition (Bubb & Krishnamurthy, 2015).  
Antipredatory laws.  The subprime lending crisis revealed the need for effective 
antipredatory laws at the state level (Curtis, 2013).  In addition, the crisis led to a 
discussion about whether the U.S. federal government made a mistake by limiting the 
influence of state antipredatory laws.  Investors used the variations in state laws and the 
federal regulatory environment to determine the impact of the federal preemption of state 
antipredatory laws on the quality of mortgages originated by the preempted lenders.  
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Ding, Quercia, Reid, and White (2012) found that the default risk was high among 
lenders who received exemptions from strong state antipredatory laws.  In particular, the 
observation was clear among refinance mortgages that had adjustable interest rates (Ding 
et al., 2012).  The preemption of state mortgage lending regulations might result in a 
significant increase in mortgage default risks that undermine consumer protection (Ding 
et al., 2012). 
A result of the subprime lending crisis was recognition of the need to carry out a 
comprehensive examination of the market to determine how a loan type can lead to 
mortgage fraud (Stowell, Barker-Cagwin, & Fellows, 2012).  Distressed economic 
conditions in the country and rapid decline of housing values were an enabling 
environment for fraudulent lending (Stowell et al., 2012).  Stowell et al. found that a need 
existed for greater vigilance within the housing market.  Immergluck (2011) described 
solutions to foreclosures using programs that would reduce foreclosure rates and their 
influences in U.S. society.  Investment in education for lenders and borrowers may stem 
the cases of fraud and fraudulent tactics within institutions.  
Community Reinvestment Loans   
Community reinvestment loans are a loan type lenders typically make available to 
low-income families and individuals.  The purpose of this loan is to promote home 
ownership in economically distressed areas of a city, county, or state.  One of the causes 
of the crisis was lending laws introduced to increase people’s ability to own homes 
(Bourassa, Haurin, Hendershott, & Hoesli, 2013; Hendrickson & Nichols, 2011); 
however, no sufficient regulations existed to prevent financial institutions from offering 
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bad loans (Hendrickson & Nichols, 2011).  One example of a lending law that increased 
mortgage risks was the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977.  The purpose of this act 
was to ensure the institutions met the needs of community members, ensure equality 
when providing loans to community members, and force banks to give loans to low-
income families that did not qualify for loans (Brescia, 2014).  Another example of such 
lending laws is the Affordable Housing Act that led to lower mortgage standards, which 
also encouraged many low-income earners to obtain mortgages.  A requirement in the 
Act was reduction of mortgage charges through subsidies that resulted in bank leaders 
introducing subprime mortgages and led to the subprime lending crisis.  
High rates of unemployment affected low-income families who had fewer sources 
from which to pay mortgages compared to moderate-income households (Agarwal, 
Amromin, & Ben-David, 2014).  Quercia, Pennington-Cross, and Yue (2012) focused on 
the mortgage default rate for low-income families, and investigated loan type, borrower 
demographics, and foreclosures.  Borrowers who eventually defaulted on the home loan 
received mortgages without assessing their capability to pay on the note, because in the 
United States people associate owning a house with many financial advantages and better 
living standards (Quercia et al., 2012).  To find a correlation between low-income 
borrowers and default rates, Quercia et al. (2012) used community reinvestment loan data 
and studied the chances of terminating mortgages by low-income families and moderate-
income families.  The study indicated that the default rate was higher among low-income 
households compared to moderate-income families and economic conditions affected 
low-income households extensively compared to moderate-income families (Quercia et 
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al., 2012).  Community reinvestment loans have high default rates, but the factors and 
terms of the loans are similar to prime and subprime loans with parameters for 
determining if the borrower is not a good fit for a home loan. 
Negative Effects of Terms Within a Mortgage 
As discussed in the section on subprime mortgages, interest rates and credit scores 
affect borrowers’ ability to pay a mortgage (Bhardwaj & Sengupta, 2012).  The effects of 
these terms within a mortgage extend beyond the subprime market and have an adverse 
relationship within the other markets, such as prime and FHA.  Prather, Lin, and Chu 
(2013) investigated absolute and relative credit risks in the mortgage market.  The 
significance of Prather et al.’s study was to establish a correlation between choices, 
prices, and default rates of five mortgage products in both a normal and a stressed 
economy.  Prather et al. found mortgage terms with default rates that were four times 
higher than conventional fixed-rate loans, and the default rates of some mortgage types 
rose to 30%.  These findings indicated the need for consumers to study the credit risk of 
multiple mortgage products before making a purchase decision.  
Adjustable rates.  Because of legislation, leaders of lending institutions 
structured loans to make the loans affordable to possible homeowners, which established 
a mix of varying interest rates (Johnson & Li, 2014).  The new products were 
nontraditional, and fixed-interest rate products were traditional and common practice 
during the past decades.  Lin, Prather, Chu, and Tsay (2013) examined the risks involved 
in traditional and nontraditional mortgage products and found that the nontraditional 
mortgage products had higher default risks.  Factors such as unwillingness to pay, 
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payment shock, and consumers’ inability to pay were the causes of high risk (Lin et al., 
2013).  Regardless of low interest rates at the initial phases, all the risks transferred to 
borrowers.  Borrowers unlikely to repay debts would favor an agreement with a huge 
prepayment fine, whereas borrowers who were more likely to prepay loans would prefer 
an agreement with a high interest rate and smaller prepayment fine (Bian & Yavas, 
2013).   
The monetary policy of the Federal Reserve may have contributed to the subprime 
lending crisis that followed the economic downturn in 2007 and the subsequent negative 
macroeconomic developments (Spencer & Huston, 2013).  Spencer and Huston (2013) 
collected and analyzed empirical data and found that the data were in agreement with 
data from other researchers who believed that monetary policy between 2002 and 2005 
stimulated the low federal funds rate.  Moreover, Spencer and Huston’s findings 
supported Alan Greenspan’s and other economists’ view that the links between the 
housing market, long-term rates, and short-term rates deteriorated between 2002 and 
2005.  Poor monetary policies served to encourage the development of the subprime 
lending crisis (Foote & Willen, 2016).  Monetary policies such as bank rates can affect 
house valuations.  The federal government established relationships between the housing 
market and monetary policies, such as the long-term and short-term federal rates.  
Spencer and Huston provided relevant information on how the performance of the 
housing market, particularly pricing, depends on the monetary policies in place during a 
specified period, which supports the claim that poor monetary policies in an economy 
contribute to a subprime lending crisis. 
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In an investigation of the relationship between lenders’ and customers’ choices, 
default rates, and house prices, Shi and Riley (2014) established that the default rate for 
adjustable-rate mortgage products was higher when compared to fixed-rate mortgage 
products.  Various factors were the cause of this difference, and one factor was that 
borrowers who choose adjustable-rate loans were mostly high-risk borrowers (Shi & 
Riley, 2014).  The popularity of the adjustable-rate product is a factor that contributed to 
the subprime loan crisis in 2005 (Foote & Willen, 2016).  Economic conditions in a 
country are more likely to affect those who choose adjustable-rate loans, which in turn 
affect default rates.  Default rates were high when many borrowers chose adjustable-rate 
mortgages, which increased the probability of payment shock when rates increased (Shi 
& Riley, 2014).   
Credit risks.  Borrower demographic characteristics, income, and fiscal history 
are factors that lenders considered during the lending process (Courchane, Kiefer, & 
Zorn, 2015).  Borrowers’ credit history gives a quantifiable understanding of the 
propensity to meet credit obligations on time.  Furthermore, the cumulative credit score a 
borrower maintained is an acceptable indicator within the financial realm (Hyra, Squires, 
Renner, & Kirk, 2013).  Because of credit risks, tools such as hybrid loans were 
instrumental in stretching income and accommodating diverse demographic trends for 





The Obama administration and the U.S. Congress attempted to stem the effects of 
the subprime lending crisis and prevent further damage through legislation and programs 
to help to those most affected by falling house prices (Bratt & Immergluck, 2015).  The 
devastation of the subprime lending crisis on homeowners, banks, and the U.S. economy 
forced political leadership to intervene.  Entire cities and regions of the country 
experienced the effects of the subprime lending crisis, and federal and state authorities 
attempted various approaches to prevent further damage to the economy.  These 
legislative acts resulted from the need for political leadership to protect the American 
dream of home ownership (Avramenko & Boyd, 2013; LoPucki, 2014). 
Legislation.  A realization of ordinary Americans’ economic hardship from the 
subprime mortgage crisis led to the formulation of the Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief 
Act of 2007 (Avramenko & Boyd, 2013) to reduce foreclosure and stem lenders’ losses.  
Political leaders designed legislative measures to enable lenders to face the crisis without 
suffering severe economic hardship.  However, some of the laws failed to work as 
expected because of constitutional issues.  For example, the intentions of the Helping 
Families Save Their Homes Act (Homes Act) was to enable families to save their homes 
and reduce home foreclosures with easy mortgage loan modifications.  Such laws might 
increase the appeal of nonpayment by extending the foreclosure procedure and the time 
borrowers who have stopped paying the mortgage can stay in their homes without rent 
debts (Demiroglu, Dudley, & James 2014).  Demiroglu, Dudley, and James (2014) 
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examined the differences in state foreclosure laws and the effect of those laws on the 
cases of nonpayment in the residential mortgage market.  
Lawsuits.  Establishing national laws allows for a debate of state-level legislation 
to control for predatory borrowing and monetary institution foreclosure activities.  The 
antipredatory laws were effective in reducing common broker practices and decreasing 
mortgage fraud, yet are expensive, are challenging to implement, and remain uncertain as 
to the efficacy (Baumer, Arnio, & Wolff, 2013).  The subprime lending crisis led to a 
significant increase in lawsuits involving mortgages.  The 1993 Nobelman v. American 
Savings Bank Supreme Court ruling prevented bankruptcy among Americans whose 
home values had fallen (LoPucki, 2014).  LoPucki (2014) identified a precedent that 
would allow judges to accept the loan modification plans, which would serve the best 
interests of the U.S. economy, homeowners, and lenders.  An examination of legislation 
and lawsuits may lead to solutions to problems and suggestions for regulatory measures 
and legislative acts.   
Suggested Preventive Measures  
In an effort to limit the severity of the damage, the U.S. federal government 
attempted to reduce the number of foreclosures, although progress was slow.  
Consequently, the focus of recent research rests on trying to determine the availability of 
effective models for understanding housing prices and housing market behavior 
(Burnside, Eichenbaum, & Rebelo, 2016).  For example, Clark (2011) examined the 
efficacy of the utility model of housing market behavior and the hedonic price model to 
test if both were still relevant models in an increasingly uncertain housing market.  The 
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housing sector may influence policy models in the future; however, Clark (2011) noted a 
need for new models that acknowledge changes in the housing market.  One measure 
Clark proposed was for the market to change forecasting models with changes in 
economic conditions.  
Policies. Researchers provide important insights regarding how policy makers can 
influence the housing market in a positive direction by formulating and implementing 
policies for managing foreclosures (Mayhew & Mayhew, 2014).  In 2009, the federal 
government implemented various forms of federal assistance, including the Home 
Affordable Foreclosure Program and the popular Home Affordable Modification 
Program in many parts of the United States as forms of financial relief to millions of 
people with an impending foreclosure (Zhu, Janowiak, Ji, Karamon, & McManus,  2015; 
Mayhew & Mayhew, 2014).  However, none of the supporters of these programs claimed 
the relief programs were adequate for the affected mortgage holders, particularly those 
from the most affected areas of the United States (Mayhew & Mayhew, 2014).  Mayhew 
and Mayhew (2014) suggested that because of the housing foreclosures, authorities in 
Richmond, California, realized erosion was reducing the tax base of the economy.  To 
prevent further erosion of the tax base, the authorities in Richmond recommended 
acquiring mortgages through the eminent domain process and modifying loans to make 
them affordable (Mayhew & Mayhew, 2014).  Mayhew and Mayhew concluded that 
depending on the types of policies formulated and implemented, authorities tend to 
promulgate policies that will sustain the tax base, which potentially affects housing 
pricing and contributes to the subprime lending crisis.  
39 
 
The severity of the subprime lending crisis indicated the need to develop effective 
measures to ensure such challenges do not endanger the U.S. economy again (Foote & 
Willen, 2016).  The crisis affected the servicing of mortgages in the industry overall, and 
dislocations and bankruptcies affected banks.  However, the people harmed the most 
were homeowners who lost their homes because of the inability to pay the home loan.  
The failure of the banking institutions to implement due diligence served to encourage 
the lending crisis (Russell, Moulton, & Greenbaum, 2014).  The responsible government 
authorities failed to regulate mortgages given prior to the subprime crisis.  As a result, 
Russell et al. (2014) suggested that efforts to ensure the subprime lending crisis does not 
occur again must address several fundamental concerns: (a) The federal government 
should implement stringent regulatory oversight over the securities and lending industry; 
(b) the individuals and institutions responsible for creating the 2007-2009 subprime 
lending crisis should be accountable; (c) lenders need to overcome barriers to 
participation, such as stigma, lack of information, or incomprehensible information 
regarding the lending process, to decrease the impact of another crisis (Russell et al., 
2014).  
The subprime lending crisis prompted intense public debate regarding the nature 
of the housing market.  Multiple views exist regarding the influence of the prevailing 
nature of the housing market on the crisis.  Weak regulatory oversight played a 
substantive role in creating an enabling environment for the subprime lending crisis to 
occur (Jefferson, 2013).  The financial industry leaders’ unwillingness to participate 
restricted the programs in place from benefiting distressed homeowners, and bank 
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leaders’ decisions to participate in loan restructuring were voluntary (Jefferson, 2013).  
The loss of trust in the financial industry and homeownership values challenged cultural 
and moral beliefs in the American dream of home ownership and the connection with 
banks (Jefferson, 2013).  According to Madhavi (2014), the U.S. mortgage industry could 
improve by using callable covered bonds, strict and comprehensive underwriting, the 
application of recourse mortgages, and strict regulation.   
Securitization.  The goal of securitization is to safeguard against high-risk loans 
because such loans have a higher propensity for violation and lead to foreclosures.  Casu 
et al. (2013) investigated whether lenders improved their performance by practicing 
securitization in an effort to assess credit risk.  Scrutinizing banks was productive 
because the effort easily exposed credit risk (Casu et al., 2013).  Despite such credit risk 
assessments, commercial banks continued to incur increased funding costs after funding 
structure improvements (Casu et al., 2013).  Krainer and Laderman (2013) also 
investigated the valuation of securitized loans and found that loans offered through 
securitization were riskier because lenders securitize loans to spread risks to clients, 
which leads to lower loan performance.  In the California mortgage market in 2000 
private loan securitization contributed to poor loan performance by reducing the quality 
of mortgage standards.  The regulation of loan prices and securitization led to lower 
mortgage charges in privately securitized loans (Krainer & Laderman, 2013).  
Ethical lending and mortgage terms.  Lenders have a responsibility to meet 
public objectives influenced by factors such as government regulations and funding 
(Moulton, 2012).  Moulton (2012) examined a group of private mortgage lenders who 
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participated in public lending programs, and found many institutions continued to have 
riskier loans, although some did not.  Avoidance of high risk-loans among private 
mortgage lenders was in response to regulatory oversight forcing the institutional leaders 
to act in publicly responsible ways.  Different organizations had different publicly 
responsible behaviors because of varied strategic and institutionalized reactions to 
political authorities (Moulton, 2012).  An increase in political authority will not 
necessarily make lenders acquire responsible behaviors.  Reduced house prices and an 
increased number of subprime and alternative mortgage products caused the mortgage 
crisis, which contributed to the high rate of foreclosures and defaults (Cox, Brounen, & 
Neuteboom, 2014).  Many people do not understand the loan terms described in mortgage 
notes; however, those who do understand the details of the terms make better decisions 
regarding purchasing homes with alternative loans (Cox et al., 2014).  Chiang and Sa-
Aadu (2013) proposed a financial training service and advice for potential borrowers to 
reduce errors associated with investments. 
Transition and Summary 
Between 2007 and 2009, millions of foreclosure cases occurred, and millions 
more homeowners were vulnerable to foreclosure (Geanokoplos, 2014).  Subprime 
mortgage holders represented the greatest amount of default as a percentage compared to 
prime, FHA, and VA loan borrowers.  Multiple factors contributed to the default rates of 
prime and subprime mortgages, primarily adjustable rates, early payment penalties, and 
credit scores (Geanokoplos, 2014).   
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The purpose of this review of the literature was to provide a comprehensive 
analysis and synthesis of the existing body of research on the subprime lending crisis, 
loan types, and predatory lending.  The focus of Section 1 was to present a foundation to 
examine if loan product and loan amount predict the likelihood of loan foreclosure.  The 
following section includes a description of the project with discussions of the research 





Section 2: The Project 
This section includes an overview of the research method, data collection, and 
data analysis procedures used in this study.  First, this section includes a restatement of 
the problem and a discussion of the role of the researcher, followed by discussion of and 
a rationale for the selected research method and design.  Additional sections include 
descriptions of the population and sample, ethical assurances, the data collection 
instrument, the data collection procedure, the proposed data analysis process, and issues 
of study validity.  This section concludes with a brief summary and transition. 
Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this quantitative correlational study was to examine if loan 
product and loan amount predict the likelihood of loan foreclosure.  The predictor 
variables were loan product and loan amount.  The criterion variable was foreclosure.  
The population consisted of data records of mortgage holders in Clayton, Henry, 
Rockdale, Fulton, and Spalding counties of the Atlanta Sixth Federal Reserve District in 
Georgia, between 2013 and 2016.  Lenders may use results from this study to improve 
their understanding of factors associated with increased foreclosure risks.  Implications 
for positive social change include improved stakeholder understanding of the correlations 
among loan product, loan amount, and foreclosure, which may be useful to develop and 
implement less risky lending policies.   
Role of the Researcher 
The study involved collecting data from an archival source: CoreLogic.  I had no 
active role or relationship with the agency and no knowledge of any of the mortgagors 
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associated with the housing loans.  The research setting was the state of Georgia, where I 
am a licensed realtor.  Because the study included only archival financial data, there were 
no human participants.   
Researchers must adhere to basic ethical principles in conducting studies.  The 
Belmont Report includes an outline of the ethical principles for research involving human 
participants (National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical 
and Behavioral Research, 1978).  I maintained basic ethical principles when accessing 
and using the data.  The data did not include any demographic information for the 
mortgagors; therefore, there was no risk of identification or privacy violation.  A 
representative from CoreLogic provided a data sample.  The topic of the research 
questions was the relationship, if any, among loan product, mortgage amount, and 
foreclosure. 
Research Method and Design 
Research Method 
I used a quantitative method to examine the research question by collecting and 
analyzing mortgage data from CoreLogic, which was an archival source.  Using 
quantitative methods is the most effective approach to a study that involves empirical 
data (Yilmaz, 2013).  The goal of the research was to establish whether significant 
relationships exist between loan product, mortgage amount, and foreclosure, so a 
quantitative method was appropriate.  A qualitative method is appropriate for assessing 
individuals’ subjective experiences, but the quantitative method is the best choice for 
assessing relationships among several objectively measurable variables (Davies & 
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Hughes, 2014).  A qualitative method was not suitable for this study because the problem 
and focus of the study did not involve the subjective experiences of individuals. 
The use of a mixed method approach would have been unsuitable because adding 
a qualitative component to the study would not aid in addressing the research question.  A 
mixed method approach is most appropriate when researchers need to conduct an initial 
exploratory analysis to determine what factors may influence the variables of interest.  
Researchers who use the quantitative method can objectively quantify and measure 
specific variables of interest and determine if significant relationships exist between the 
variables using statistical analysis (Howell, 2013; Yilmaz, 2013).  Therefore, the 
quantitative method was the most appropriate approach to examine the relationships 
between the predictor variables, loan product and loan amount, and the criterion variable, 
foreclosure. 
Research Design 
To assess the research question, this study included a correlational design.  A 
correlational design is appropriate when investigating relationships between predictor and 
criterion variables (Howell, 2013).  The goal of the study was to investigate the 
relationships between loan product, mortgage amount, and foreclosure.  Thus, a 
correlational design was the best approach for addressing the research question.  Other 
types of quantitative designs that received consideration included the experimental 
design, but it was not suitable for the study.  Experimental designs are appropriate when 
the goal of the research is to determine cause-and-effect relationships by manipulating 
and controlling the predictor variables (Howell, 2013; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2012).  In an 
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experimental design, a researcher must be able to assign participants to conditions or 
groups randomly (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2012).  I could not randomly assign group 
membership for this study.  Thus, an experimental design was not suitable for this study. 
Population and Sampling 
The population consisted of data records dated between 2013 and 2016 for 
mortgage holders in Clayton, Henry, Rockdale, Fulton, and Spalding counties of the 
Atlanta Sixth Federal Reserve District in Georgia.  Data collected for the target 
population were archival records concerning loan product, mortgage amount, and 
foreclosure.  The source of the sampling frame was the CoreLogic Company.  The 
sampling method was a probabilistic simple random sample taken from the sampling 
frame.  Specifically, I used the select-cases command in the Statistical Packages for 
Social Science (SPSS) to draw cases from the sampling frame data set randomly.  A 
simple random sample is an appropriate sampling method to obtain a sample 
representative of the population (Emerson, 2015; Howell, 2013; Uprichard, 2013). 
Conducting a power analysis was necessary to determine the minimum sample 
size needed to conduct the analysis.  Power refers to the ability to find a significant 
difference in a sample when a relationship exists in the population.  Statistical power 
refers to the ability of a test to capture significance and is equivalent to one minus the 
probability of a Type II error, which refers to not finding significance in the sample when 
it occurs in the population (Field, 2013).  A Type I error occurs when a researcher rejects 
a null hypothesis when it is true.  Thus, a Type I error equates to finding significance in 
the sample when it does not exist within the larger population (a false positive).  To 
47 
 
combat these errors, the study included the conventional values for power (.80), alpha 
level (.05), and effect size (medium).  Unless the theory guiding a study dictates the use 
of other values, experts recommend applying these conventional values (Field, 2013; 
Kraemer & Blasey, 2015).  With the predetermined parameters of alpha = .05, power = 
.80, and a medium effect size, I used G*Power 3.1.9.2 to calculate an appropriate sample 
for a logistic regression.  Based on these calculations, a sample of 473 cases was 
sufficient for the analysis (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009). 
Ethical Research 
Because the data in this study were archival, fewer ethical requirements were 
necessary compared to research with human subjects.  No informed consent was 
necessary, as the study included only archival data.  No direct contact with any of the 
mortgagors occurred, and the data did not include personal information from any of the 
mortgagors.  There were no incentives to participate in the study because data collection 
was already complete.  Documentation outlining permission to use the archival data 
appears in Appendix A.  Receiving Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval for the 
archival data was necessary (Walden IRB approval no. 06-08-17-0434302).  For retention 
purposes, data used in the research will remain on my computer in a password-protected 
folder for 5 years to ensure the confidentiality of the data such that no one else has access 
to the loan data.  Five years after the completion of the dissertation, I will delete the data. 
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Data Collection  
Instrumentation 
The study did not involve defined instruments.  Data for the variables of interest 
came directly from loan records provided by CoreLogic.  CoreLogic has access to loan 
information in the state of Georgia and provides this information for research purposes.  I 
selected the information to measure variables directly in order to answer the research 
question.  The creation of constructs was unnecessary, and concerns of validity did not 
pertain to the data. 
Loan product. Loan product served as a predictor variable with measurement on 
a nominal scale.  A nominal scale is a scale that involves discreet categories that do not 
follow any sequential order (Field, 2013).  According to the data code sheet principles 
CoreLogic provided, the types of loan products specified in the data included community 
development authority, conventional, FHA, farmers home administration, leasehold 
mortgage, private party lender, U.S. Small Business Administration, VA, and wraparound 
mortgages.  For the data analysis, loan product was dummy-coded with the largest loan 
category in the sample serving as the reference group. 
Mortgage amount. Mortgage amount in U.S. dollars served as a predictor 
variable.  Mortgage amount was a ratio-level variable.  In a ratio level of measurement, 
the values of the variable are such that equal differences in intervals between values 
represent equal differences in values, and the values have a true zero point (Field, 2013).  
Specifically, mortgage amount was the total amount of the loan in U.S. dollars. 
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Foreclosure. Foreclosure served as the dichotomous criterion variable, with two 
levels: foreclosure and no foreclosure.  For data analysis coding purposes, Pallant (2013) 
assigned the value of “0” to whichever response indicates a lack or absence of the 
characteristic of interest.  Foreclosure was the characteristic of interest.  Therefore, I 
assigned “0” to no foreclosure and “1” to foreclosure. 
Data Collection Technique 
Data consisted of archival data.  Researchers collect archival data prior to a 
research study for varied purposes, and such data are available for researchers to use and 
analyze (Brakewood & Poldrack, 2013).  Advantages to using archival data are the speed 
and efficiency of obtaining data already collected, the reduction of cost and burden on 
potential participants by maximizing the use of collected data, and the reduction of cost 
and burden on the researcher (Brakewood & Poldrack, 2013; Fecher, Friesike, & Hebing, 
2015).  Disadvantages to using archival data are the increased potential for breaches in 
participant confidentiality and the limitations to the populations, time periods, and 
variables that are available in the data (Brakewood & Poldrack, 2013). 
The archival data came from a third party, CoreLogic, that had access to loan 
information in the state of Georgia.  After providing the specific variables of the study, I 
received permission from an authorized individual in the organization to use the data.  A 
representative of the organization obtained the data upon request and sent them as an 
Excel spreadsheet along with a codebook that described the variables within the data file.  
The advantage of using an external organization is that the data collection is already 
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complete.  Thus, the study included data collected systematically by members of a 
financial organization rather than data collected using smaller scale sampling procedures. 
Data Analysis 
The research question and hypotheses for this study were as follows:  
RQ: Do loan product and loan amount predict the likelihood of loan foreclosure? 
H0: Loan product and loan amount do not predict the likelihood of loan 
foreclosure. 
Ha: Loan product and loan amount do predict the likelihood of loan 
foreclosure. 
Binary logistic regression, as used in this study, is an appropriate statistical 
analysis when the goal of the research is to examine the relationships between multiple 
predictor variables and a single binary criterion variable (Field, 2013; Stevens, 2009).  
Researchers use binary logistic regression to predict an event with two possible outcomes 
based on a set of predictor variables (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2012), and researchers use 
logistic regression to determine the extent to which the likelihood of an outcome 
increases or decreases as the values of the predictor variables increase or decrease (Field, 
2013).  Therefore, binary logistic regression was appropriate for this study as I assessed 
the likelihood of predictor variables predicting loan foreclosure.  
Other predictive analyses considered included multiple linear regression and 
discriminant analysis.  Multiple linear regression is a statistical technique researchers use 
to predict values of an interval or ratio-level variable (Field, 2013; Stevens, 2009; 
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2012).  Therefore, multiple linear regression was not appropriate 
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because the criterion variable investigated was not an interval or ratio-level variable.  
Finally, the use of discriminant analysis is appropriate when attempting to predict a 
categorical outcome based on multiple predictor variables, but may be less robust and 
carries more stringent assumptions than logistic regression (Field, 2013).  Therefore, 
discriminant analysis was not appropriate for this study. 
I screened the data for any missing values or outliers.  Cases with missing values 
for the variables of interest (e.g., loan product, mortgage amount, or foreclosure) were not 
part of the study.  Outliers underwent examination prior to analysis.  Stevens (2009) 
noted that an outlier is a value greater than 3.29 standard deviations from the mean.  Any 
observations of mortgage amount identified as outliers did not remain part of the study.  
Additionally, testing the assumptions of the statistical analysis helped ensure statistical 
conclusion validity.  The three assumptions within logistic regression concern (a) sample 
size, (b) multicollinearity, and (c) outliers.  Assessment strategies and any actions 
necessary if the data showed a gross violation of the assumptions remained part of the 
study. 
Sample Size 
The first assumption of binary logistic regression was that the sample size was 
sufficiently large to obtain statistically valid results.  I ensured the satisfaction of this 
assumption by sampling no fewer than the minimum number of cases, as indicated by the 





Multicollinearity refers to the degree that predictor variables correlate with each 
other (Stevens, 2009).  Binary logistic regression requires that the predictor variables do 
not correlate too highly (Menard, 2009; Stevens, 2009).  Testing for multicollinearity 
involved using variance inflation factors.  According to Menard (2009), variance inflation 
factor values greater than 10 indicate significant multicollinearity among the predictor 
variables.  Removal of the appropriate predictor variables from the regression model 
occurs if there is an assumption violation. 
Outliers 
Binary logistic regression calculations function correctly if no outliers are present 
in the data (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2012).  Stevens (2009) defined an outlier as a value 
greater than 3.29 standard deviations from the mean.  Determining outliers of the 
mortgage amount variable occurred prior to analysis, followed by exclusion from analysis 
of any cases containing outliers. 
Computation and tabulation of the binary logistic regression involved the 
following statistics: (a) beta, (b) standard error, (c) Wald value, (d) degrees of freedom, 
(e) p value, (f) odds ratio, and (g) 95% confidence interval for odds ratio.  Beta is the raw 
regression coefficient calculated for each predictor variable (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2012).  
The standard error is a measure of the variability in the regression coefficient 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2012).  The Wald value is the test statistic for the significance of 
the regression coefficient and follows a chi-square distribution (Field, 2013).  The 
degrees of freedom refer to the number of values that are free to vary in the calculation of 
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the significance test (Field, 2013).  The p value represents the probability of obtaining a 
coefficient as extreme as the observed coefficient if the true value in the population was 
zero (Field, 2013).  The p value also helps interpret the significance of the results.  If the 
p value is less than .05, the result is significant.  The odds ratio represents the change in 
likelihood of the outcome coded as “1” for each one unit change in the predictor variable 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2012).  Finally, the 95% confidence interval for the odds ratio is 
the confidence interval for the value of the odds ratio.  The expectation was the 
confidence interval would contain the true value of the parameter in 95% of samples 
(Hoekstra, Morey, Rouder, & Wagenmakers, 2014).  I used SPSS Version 24.0 (IBM 
Corp., 2016) as a tool for data analysis. 
Study Validity 
External validity refers to the ability to generalize results to the larger population.  
Because the data collected included mortgages from counties of the Atlanta Sixth Federal 
Reserve District in Georgia, which is the U.S. district with the highest rate of foreclosed 
homes in the country (Alm et al., 2014; Georgia Watch, 2010; Raymond, 2016), the 
sample served as an adequate representation of the population.  By including at least 473 
observations, the power of the analysis was high enough to find significance if it existed 
in the larger population.   
Statistical conclusion validity refers to the extent that results of data analysis are 
accurate and valid.  Strategies for mitigating threats to statistical conclusion validity 
consisted of ensuring that the sample size was sufficient to draw valid conclusions from 
the data analysis and that no major violations existed of the statistical assumptions for 
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binary logistic regression.  Use of power analysis determined the minimum sample size 
required for the analysis, and testing the assumptions of binary logistic regression took 
place prior to analysis. 
Transition and Summary 
Section 2 included a discussion of the methodology of the study, the reasoning 
behind conducting a quantitative correlational design, the use of archival data and 
variables, and the reasoning behind conducting a binary logistic regression.  The section 
also included details about the data collection and data analysis.  Section 3 consists of the 




Section 3: Application to Professional Practice and Implications for Change 
The purpose of this quantitative correlational study was to examine if loan 
product and loan amount predict the likelihood of loan foreclosure.  The predictor 
variables were loan product and loan amount.  The criterion variable was foreclosure.  
Data analysis led to rejecting the null hypothesis and supporting the alternative 
hypothesis.  Loan product and loan amount significantly predicted the likelihood of loan 
foreclosure. 
Presentation of the Findings 
This subsection includes a discussion on testing the assumptions, descriptive 
statistics, inferential statistics, and the findings as they relate to theory.  Specifically, I 
tested the assumptions of sample size, multicollinearity, and outliers.  The inferential 
statistical test conducted to address the research question was a binary logistic regression. 
Tests of Assumptions 
The study involved evaluating the assumptions of sample size, multicollinearity, 
and outliers.  Ensuring a sufficient sample size involved randomly sampling 473 cases 
from the archival data obtained from CoreLogic.  The random sampling involved using 
the select-cases procedure in SPSS.  The initial data set obtained from CoreLogic 
contained 52,394 cases, and the evaluation of multicollinearity involved using variance 
inflation factors.  Menard (2009) noted that variance inflation factor values greater than 
10 indicate significant multicollinearity among predictor variables.  All variance inflation 





Variance Inflation Factor Values for Predictor Variables 
Predictor Variance inflation factors
Loan product (Reference: conventional)  
Federal Housing Authority 1.07 
Private party lender 1.03 
Veterans Administration 1.05 
Loan amount 1.01 
 
Evaluating outliers involved calculating the number of standard deviations each 
value for loan amount was from the mean.  Stevens (2009) defined outliers as values 
more than 3.29 standard deviations from the mean.  Nine values of loan amount were 
more than 3.29 standard deviations above the mean, and there were two values of “1” for 
loan amount.  I excluded these cases from the analysis, which left a final of 462 cases 
included in the analysis. 
Descriptive Statistics 
There were 52,394 cases in the CoreLogic data set, with 473 cases randomly 
sampled from the data set for this study.  Eliminating 11 cases due to outliers resulted in 
462 cases for the analysis.  Loan amounts ranged from $2,984 to $175,524,452 (M = 
$1,212,634; SD = $11,965,553).  Table 4 includes the descriptive statistics for loan 




Descriptive Statistics for Loan Product and Foreclosure 
Variable Frequency % 
Loan product 
 
Conventional 275 59.5 
Federal Housing Authority 120 26.0 
Private party lender   20   4.3 
Veterans Administration   47 10.2 
Foreclosure 
 
Not in foreclosure 447 96.8 
Foreclosure   15   3.2 
 
Inferential Results 
The study included binary logistic regression to examine if loan product and loan 
amount predicted the likelihood of loan foreclosure.  The predictor variables were loan 
product and loan amount.  Data analysis involved dummy-coding loan product, with the 
largest loan category (conventional) serving as the reference group.  The outcome 
variable was foreclosure.  The null hypothesis was loan product and loan amount do not 
predict the likelihood of loan foreclosure.  The alternative hypothesis was loan product 
and loan amount do predict the likelihood of loan foreclosure.  The preliminary steps 
taken to assess the assumptions of sample size, multicollinearity, and outliers revealed no 
serious violations of the assumptions (see the Tests of Assumptions subsection above).  
The alpha level chosen to determine statistical significance was .05. 
The binary logistic regression model was significant, χ2(4) = 10.65, p = .031, 
Nagelkerke R2 = .09.  The Nagelkerke R2 value indicated that the model explained 9% of 
the variability in foreclosure.  Because the binary logistic regression model was 
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significant, data analysis led to rejecting the null hypothesis and supporting the 
alternative hypothesis; therefore, loan product and loan amount significantly predicted 
the likelihood of loan foreclosure.  Statistics for each binary logistic regression predictor 
are in Table 5.  The dummy-coded loan product category of FHA was a significant 
positive predictor (B = 1.71, p = .015).  The odds ratio for this predictor indicated that 
FHA loans were 5.52 times more likely to be in foreclosure than conventional loans.  The 
dummy-coded loan product category of private party lender was not a predictor (B = 
1.55, p = .190).  The dummy-coded loan product category of VA was a significant 
positive predictor (B = 2.12, p = .007).  The odds ratio for this predictor indicated that 
VA loans were 8.31 times more likely to be in foreclosure than conventional loans.  Loan 
amount was not a significant predictor (B = 0.00, p = .892). 
Table 5 
Binary Logistic Regression Predicting Foreclosure 
 95% CI odds ratio
Predictor B SE Wald df Sig. Odds ratio Lower Upper
Loan product 
(Reference: conventional) 
        
Federal Housing 
Authority 
1.71 0.70 5.94 1 .015 5.52 1.40 21.83 
Private party lender 1.55 1.18 1.71 1 .190 4.69 0.46 47.41 
Veterans Administration 2.12 0.78 7.32 1 .007 8.31 1.79 38.50 
Loan amount 0.00 0.00 0.02 1 .892 1.00 1.00   1.00 
Note. χ2(4) = 10.65, p = .031, Nagelkerke R2 = .09. 
 
In summary, the binary logistic regression conducted to answer the research 
question was significant, which indicated that loan product and loan amount significantly 
predicted the likelihood of loan foreclosure.  Specifically, FHA loans (compared to 
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conventional) and VA loans (compared to conventional) were significant positive 
predictors, meaning that FHA and VA loans were significantly more likely to be in 
foreclosure than conventional loans. 
Applications to Professional Practice 
The driving force behind business operations is creating value for stakeholders.  
In cases where entities face an expansion of business to create such value, it is tempting 
to assume greater risk in expectation of greater rewards.  However, as evidenced by the 
subprime mortgage crisis, such is not always the case.  Particularly in situations where 
mortgage-backed securities are the majority of an organization’s investment portfolio, the 
variables with regard to those mortgages could mean the difference between success and 
disaster. 
The application of the current research to professional practice is to provide a 
litmus test for the likelihood of loss associated with an individual loan, a mortgage 
package, or a portfolio based largely upon mortgage-backed securities.  Understanding 
the link between the particular mortgage type and its inherent risk allows business leaders 
to make decisions based upon their acceptance or aversion to risk.  Organizations whose 
leaders are risk-accepting can have portfolios with large percentages of FHA or VA 
loans, with an awareness of the increased risk of loss associated with such investments.  
The leaders of those risk-averse organizations looking for slow and steady growth can 
avoid such packages and opt for safer investments involving conventional loans or, in 
some cases, avoid mortgage-backed securities entirely.  
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Findings from this study generally supported Minsky’s (1986) financial instability 
hypothesis, which posits that successful markets often lead to excessive lending by banks 
in the form of high-risk home loans to poorly qualified borrowers.  Over time, a crisis 
develops when the borrowers who agreed to pay such loans can no longer afford the 
mortgage payments (Minsky, 2015).  As a result, borrowers default on home loans, which 
results in foreclosure, and mortgage lenders experience significant financial loss.  
Findings from this study revealed that FHA and VA loans were significantly more likely 
to go into foreclosure than conventional loans.  Thus, the high default rate among 
borrowers of VA and FHA loans was reflective of the financial instability hypothesis.  
Borrowers of VA and FHA loans may be more likely to take on mortgages and loan 
payments they cannot keep up with than are borrowers of conventional loans. 
The elevated foreclosure risks associated with FHA loans demonstrated in this 
study supported findings from previous research.  FHA loans promote lending to poorly 
qualified applicants (Bhardwaj & Sengupta, 2012; Quercia & Park, 2013) through liberal 
loan terms, mortgage insurance, and nontraditional mortgages (Bhardwaj & Sengupta, 
2012).  However, the riskiness of FHA loans indicated in this study revealed that such 
loans might be more risky than previously estimated.  For example, in 2009, 3% of prime 
loans were in foreclosure, 15.1% of subprime loans were in foreclosure, 3.2% of FHA 
loans were in foreclosure, and 2.2% of VA loans were in foreclosure (U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2012).  Thus, census data from 2009 indicated that FHA and VA loans were at 
lower risk for foreclosure, but data from this study indicated these two types of loans had 
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a significant association with foreclosure.  The implication for practice is that lenders 
seeking to avoid risks should avoid FHA and VA loans. 
Implications for Social Change 
The implications for positive social change include improved stakeholder 
knowledge and understanding of variables contributing to foreclosure, which may 
potentially be useful in developing and implementing less risky lending policies.  
Improved lending decisions may discourage the origination of unsustainable mortgages 
and potentially provide lenders with insight into which loan types present the most 
significant risks based on various factors.  Moreover, lenders may experience fewer 
losses in their mortgage and investment portfolios resulting in increased profitability.    
The findings in this study may also prove to be beneficial to future borrowers.  
Increased knowledge on which loan products present the most risk will aid borrowers in 
making better informed decisions prior to securing their home with a mortgage.  Thus, 
preventing homeowners from losing their homes in foreclosure and upholding property 
values in the community. 
Recommendations for Action 
The results of this research indicate a clear need for lenders and investors to 
institute policies requiring the disclosure of the types and percentages of loan products 
included in all portfolios.  Findings also indicate a need for increased regulation around 
the qualifications for FHA and VA loan products to decrease the risks associated with 
such products.  The findings from this study call into question the extension of mortgage 
loans to individuals who may not be able to meet their obligations to such commitments. 
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Findings from this investigation may be salient to a variety of stakeholders, 
including mortgage lenders and borrowers.  A practical way to disseminate results is to 
create a white paper to distribute to interested stakeholders.  Additional forms of 
dissemination may involve presenting the findings at professional and academic 
conferences or using the findings to create trainings for borrowers and lenders. 
Recommendations for Further Research 
Recommendations for further research include the area of subprime mortgages, 
the extension of credit to individuals lacking appropriate credit scores and capital, and the 
ways portfolio mix can guard against catastrophic losses.  Extension of the current 
research beyond the state of Georgia may help to eliminate the potential for geographic 
bias in the sample included in the study.  Both of these suggestions rely on an assumption 
that lenders use the same criteria for underwriting and approval processes. 
Future researchers may also examine why borrowers of FHA and VA loans are at 
a greater risk for default than borrowers of conventional loans.  Another direction for 
future investigation would be to examine the effectiveness of different types of loan 
counseling for reducing default risks among VA and FHA borrowers.  Replicating this 
study in different areas of the country could reveal geographic differences that exist in the 
default risks associated with different loan types. 
Reflections 
Reflecting on the Doctorate of Business Administration doctoral study process 
has led me to an understanding of my preconceived notions and the personal biases 
brought to the work.  I found myself inserting my assumptions about individuals with 
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questionable credit scores into the work and predetermining their failure before 
completely reviewing the outcomes.  I came to understand that doctoral-level research 
involves a great deal of bracketing and setting aside of prior knowledge as a way to 
approach problems with a clear mind and fresh ideas. 
Conclusion 
The results of this work revealed that, although the need for subprime lending 
exists in the United States, the oversight and regulation of such mortgages needs to 
improve.  Many Americans dream of home ownership that would be out of reach if they 
do not have access to loan products that allow them to obtain mortgages without great 
sums of capital.  Those who have experienced credit challenges in the past may also 
benefit from such loans if they have improved their ability to make loan payments.  
Although eliminating these products is not a recommended action, the clear correlation 
between their existence and the increased risk of default sheds light on the importance of 
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